Robinson-Patman Act
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Total Wine Tests the Boundaries of FTC CIDs

Total Wine & More (Total Wine) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are currently clashing in federal court over a civil investigative demand (CID) that the FTC issued to Total Wine, a third party in the FTC’s investigation of Southern Glazer’s Wine & Spirits, LLC (Southern Glazer).

Total Wine has fervently resisted producing certain corporate documents and data in response to the FTC’s subpoena. It is rare that companies challenge the FTC’s authority to compel production and take such a strong stance against complying with agency CIDs for information. This dispute could have wide-ranging implications for third-party CID compliance, regardless of the industry. For companies operating in the alcohol industry and following the FTC’s investigation into Southern Glazer, the court’s decision could have a serious impact on the investigation as it will impact the breadth of documents and data to which the FTC will have access to for its case.

Under Section 20 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1, the FTC is empowered to issue CIDs, a type of administrative subpoena, to require any person—including third parties—to produce documents or other information, file written reports or answers and give oral testimony relating to any FTC enforcement investigation. When third-party companies are issued CIDs, they usually negotiate the scope and comply, albeit reluctantly, with the requests, as refusing to comply typically is not advised. As part of the FTC’s investigation into Southern Glazer’s business practices and, specifically, whether the company has engaged in discriminatory practices in its sales to retailers in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act or engaged in other unfair competition practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, the agency issued a number of CIDs to third parties, as is customary. However, in a rare turn of events, a third party, Total Wine, and the FTC have ended up in a court battle over the subpoena.

After making limited productions, Total Wine filed an administrative petition with the FTC to limit the CID’s scope. This action is rarely taken by third parties, who often focus on negotiating the scope of the requests and limiting the burden of compliance to the extent possible, as opposed to challenging the CID itself. The FTC outright denied Total Wine’s petition, and in October, after four months of Total Wine’s resistance to comply fully, the FTC filed a petition seeking a federal court order to force Total Wine to comply with the CID.

In its petition to the court, the FTC alleged Total Wine “unilaterally narrowed the scope of the CID in a manner inconsistent with the CID’s specifications and refused to search any employee’s custodial files for responsive documents.” Although Total Wine has produced purchase-related transaction data to the FTC, it has persistently refused to produce information relating to email communications, business strategies and competitor assessments, and it has described the scope of the FTC’s demand as “truly alarming.” Despite FTC staff and Total Wine trying to work cooperatively together, the FTC has deemed Total Wine’s CID response severely [...]

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Local Wholesaler-Retailer Dispute Has Federal Implications

On August 14, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued an opinion finding that state regulations bolstered one antitrust claim and hindered another in an ongoing dispute between a northern Mississippi convenience store chain, Major Mart, and an Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI, a/k/a “Red Network”) distributor, Mitchell Distributing Company.

In Mississippi, by statute, like those of many other states, beer manufacturers must designate exclusive sales territories for each brand.  Mitchell holds the exclusive right to sell ABI brands to retailers in the counties in which Major Mart operates its 11 convenience stores.

The relationship between Mitchell and Major Mart started to break down in 2010, when Major Mart claimed that it was receiving inaccurate and confusing price information from Mitchell.  Major Mart asked Mitchell for compensation of lost profits due to the incorrect pricing information.  Mitchell denied the request, and Major Mart decided later to remove ABI displays and signs, lower the prices of competitors’ products, and reduce the cooler space allocated to ABI in some of its stores.  According to Major Mart’s complaint, Mitchell retaliated by (1) demanding shelving allocation that represented ABI’s market share of approximately 70 percent, (2) demanding price parity with competing products of ABI, (3) changing its deliveries to Major Mart stores to once a week so as to fill up Major Mart’s coolers and storerooms, leaving no room for competitor products and (4) delivering on Fridays so that Major Mart stores would not have cold beer on the “best selling day of the week.”

After litigation was first initiated, the parties reached a settlement in 2011, agreeing that Mitchell would increase its deliveries to at least twice per week and Major Mart would reconsider shelf space allocation and increase prices on competing brands of beers to the same price as ABI products.  This temporary resolution, however, failed when Major Mart did not reallocate its shelf space.  In response, Mitchell once again cut deliveries to one day per week and thereafter began to provide sales coupons and promotional giveaways exclusively to Major Mart’s competitors.  Major Mart also claimed that Mitchell delivered beer that was close to the end of its shelf-life, replaced fresher beer Major Mart had with older beer and missed deliveries during key dates, including July 4 and just as students were returning to college.  Eventually, Major Mart sued.

Major Mart alleged that Mitchell engaged in monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act and price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.  In response, Mitchell filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the Sherman Act did not apply, as (1) Mitchell’s actions were immunized by the State Action Doctrine—the principle that the Sherman Act does not apply to states acting in their capacities as sovereigns—and (2) Mitchell’s actions, which occurred solely in Mississippi, did not affect interstate commerce—as required for Sherman Act jurisdiction.

Quickly discarding the State Action Doctrine assertion, the court noted that to qualify as a state’s action, conduct must be “undertaken pursuant to [...]

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