In another blow to the constitutionality of alcohol beverage laws, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down on First Amendment grounds a number of Missouri’s alcohol beverage advertising laws on the basis that Missouri failed to meets it burden to demonstrate that such laws both advanced the state’s substantial interest and were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Last week, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit weighed in on the legality of restrictions on alcohol advertising under the First Amendment, issuing an opinion in Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Lacy that could eventually broaden free speech protections for alcohol beverage advertisements. After the lower court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, finding that plaintiffs’ claim alleging the unconstitutionality of a Missouri statute and two regulations should be heard.
The case concerned three Missouri provisions – two regulations and a statute – that restrict the advertising of alcohol beverages:
- a regulation prohibiting retailers from advertising price discounts outside of the licensed premises (but allowing the advertising of discounts by using generic descriptions (e.g., “Happy Hour”), as well as the advertising of specific discounts within the licensed premises);
- a regulation prohibiting retailers from advertising prices below cost; and
- a statute requiring manufacturers and wholesalers choosing to a list a retailer in an advertisement to exclude the retail price of the product from the advertisement, list multiple unaffiliated retailers and make the listing relatively inconspicuous.
Plaintiffs – a broadcasting industry group, radio station operator, winery and retailer – sued Missouri’s supervisor of liquor control and attorney general, alleging that the three provisions are facially invalid under the First Amendment in that they prohibit truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, are inconsistently enforced by the state and the challenged statute unconstitutionally compels speech.
To state a claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, Supreme Court precedent instructs that plaintiffs must show that there are no set of circumstances under which the challenged provision would be valid, or that a substantial number of the provision’s applications are unconstitutional. Alcohol beverage advertisements involve commercial speech, which receives less protection under the First Amendment than other constitutionally protected forms of expression. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York (1980), the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for determining the constitutionality of laws restricting commercial speech: whether (1) the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) the governmental interest justifying the regulation is substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances the governmental interest; and (4) the regulation is no broader than necessary to further the governmental interest.
Applying the third and fourth factors of the Central Hudson test (plaintiffs and defendants agreed on the first two factors of the test), the court found that the facts plaintiffs alleged were “more than sufficient” to state a plausible claim. First, the court opined, plaintiffs made sufficient allegations that the challenged provisions do not directly advance Missouri’s substantial interest in promoting responsible drinking. Although defendants argued that a link exists between advertising promotions and increased demand for alcohol beverages, the court noted that “multiple” inconsistencies in the regulations demonstrate that the regulations do not advance Missouri’s interest in promoting responsible drinking. Likewise, the court determined, plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to support [...]
As you likely have read in the trade press already, on Wednesday, November 28, 2018, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Lebamoff v. Rauner. The opinion adds three judges of the Seventh Circuit to the collection of legal minds rejecting the notion that the dormant Commerce Clause non-discrimination principles applied by the Supreme Court in Bacchus (1984) and Granholm (2005) should be limited to laws discriminating against producers and products.
Like other cases brought by Lebamoff and its legal team, this case involves a challenge to state laws that prohibit direct-to-consumer wine shipments by out-of-state retailers. Illinois, like many states, permits in-state retailers to deliver wine directly to Illinois consumers located anywhere in the state. The law, however, denies that same privilege to out-of-state retailers. This distinction, according to the plaintiffs, amounts to discrimination against out-of-state economic interests in violation of the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause.
The Seventh Circuit opinion rejects the reading of Granholm, embraced by the Second and Eighth Circuits, that the Supreme Court drew an implicit distinction between laws discriminating against producers and products (not permitted) and laws affecting the wholesale- or retail-tiers (immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny). Reading Granholm in its totality, the Seventh Circuit finds such an implied bright-line rule unlikely. Moreover, drawing on the Brown-Forman (1986) and Healy (1989) cases, the Seventh Circuit notes that prior Supreme Court opinions have applied dormant Commerce Clause principles to laws that did not regulate producers or products.
The Seventh Circuit, of course, recognized that its opinion could be substantially affected by the Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Byrd case now pending before the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of issues upon remand suggests a number of potential distinguishing facts that could alter the outcome of the case. Nevertheless, should the Supreme Court affirm the Sixth Circuit’s Byrd decision, the state of Illinois will have a hard time defending the discriminatory treatment challenged in Lebamoff.
On Friday, March 29, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri handed down its decision in Sarasota Wine Market v. Parson, No. 4:17CV2792. The decision upholds Missouri’s laws permitting in-state retailers to sell and deliver directly to consumers’ homes, but withholding that same privilege to out-of-state retailers. Plaintiffs had challenged the Missouri statutes under both the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution.
The decision is not surprising, as Missouri lies within the jurisdiction of the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit, in a challenge to a residency requirement in a case entitled Southern Wine & Spirits v. Division of Alc. & Tobacco Control (2013), previously held that state laws regulating retailers and wholesalers are immune from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny under the 21st Amendment. The Sarasota Wine Market decision relies heavily on Southern Wine & Spirits in rejecting the plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause challenge. And, the court reasoned that because the right to engage in the wine trade is subject to the limitations of the 21st Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not implicated.
Whether the 21st Amendment insulates state laws regulating retailers and wholesalers from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny is currently pending before the Supreme Court in the Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Blair (f/n/a Byrd) case. Thus, the Sarasota Wine Market opinion faces almost-certain reversal or affirmance, depending on how the Supreme Court rules in Blair. In the meantime, the decision serves to underscore the stakes of the question currently pending before the Supreme Court.
Latest Stage in Missouri Tied House First Amendment Litigation Could Change Economics of Industry Advertising
The latest development in a lengthy legal challenge to advertising restrictions in Missouri’s tied house laws and regulations raises practical economic issues for the alcohol beverage industry and significant legal and policy issues for legislators and regulators at all levels of government. On June 28, Judge Douglas Harpool of the US District Court for the Western District of Missouri filed a decision in Missouri Broadcasters Association vs. Dorothy Taylor. The Missouri Broadcasters Association (MBA) is a trade association representing media outlets. Two licensed Missouri retailers were also plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Ms. Dorothy Taylor is the Supervisor of the Missouri Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control (DATC).
The basic issue in the case is whether several Missouri alcohol beverage advertising restrictions violate the plaintiffs’ commercial speech rights protected by the First Amendment to the US Constitution.
The June District Court decision follows a bench trial held in February 2018. The trial occurred as the result of prior legal proceedings culminating in a 2017 decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which found that the MBA’s amended complaint “plausibly demonstrates that the challenged provisions [of Missouri’s tied house law] do not directly advance the government’s asserted substantial interest, are more extensive than necessary and unconstitutionally compel speech and association.”
Perhaps the most important Missouri law challenged in this litigation is an exception in the tied house laws that authorizes a manufacturer to pay for advertising that lists “two or more affiliated retail businesses selling its products” subject to four conditions:
(a) The advertisement shall not contain the retail price of the product;
(b) The listing of the retail businesses shall be the only reference to such retail businesses in the advertisement;
(c) The listing of the retail businesses shall be relatively inconspicuous in relation to the advertisement as a whole; and
(d) The advertisement shall not refer only to one retail business or only to a retail business controlled directly or indirectly by the same retail business.
This language may be familiar to many practitioners and regulators as a nearly identical provision appears in the Federal Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) tied house regulations. Laws and regulations of several states include similar express exceptions and TTB regulations are incorporated by reference in the trade practices regulations of other states. Innumerable TTB and state tied house laws and regulations restrict advertising in similar ways and may be invalidated if the analysis in Missouri Broadcasters is applied by other courts and ultimately upheld by federal appellate courts.
Other Missouri laws and regulations that were successfully challenged by MBA in the trial court prohibit (a) media advertising of price discounts, (b) beer and wine coupons, (c) outdoor advertising of discounts by retailers and (d) below cost advertising.
Unlike many cases based solely on theoretical legal arguments and the text of laws and regulations, the trial in the Missouri case resulted in [...]
Two recent developments reinforce my expectation that the Supreme Court will need to clarify the scope of its 2005 Granholm v. Heald decision within the next few years.
Granholm struck down state restrictions on the interstate sale and shipment of wine by wineries, where the state permitted in-state wineries to engage in such direct-to-consumer sales activities but withheld that privilege from out-of-state wineries. According to that decision, such facially-discriminatory laws are virtually per se unconstitutional under the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause, and are not saved by the additional power that states have over alcohol sales under the 21st Amendment. The Granholm court also referred to the three-tier system as “unquestionably legitimate.”
In the years since Granholm, lower federal courts have wrestled with the question of whether or not the Commerce Clause’s non-discrimination principle is limited to state laws imposing different rules on in-state versus out-of-state producers and products. Decisions by several Circuit Courts of Appeal, including the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Arnold’s Wines, 2009) and the Eighth Circuit (Southern Wine, 2013), have concluded that only those state laws discriminating against out-of-state producers or products face the high level of scrutiny mandated by Granholm. Others, including the Fifth Circuit (Cooper II, 2016) and the Sixth Circuit (Byrd, 2018), have concluded that state laws regulating the wholesale- and retail-tiers remain subject to vigorous Commerce Clause scrutiny. Notably, however, the Fifth and Sixth Circuit opinions also suggest that the outcome of a challenge to a state law regulating the wholesale- or retail-tier may depend on the type of law challenged, and both involved residency requirements for licensees, not laws directly regulating the sale and shipment of alcohol. (more…)
On February 21, 2018, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit published its opinion in Byrd v. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association, No. 17-5552. The decision, which includes a partial dissent, affirms a Middle District of Tennessee decision finding that the “durational-residency” (residency) requirements imposed by Tennessee law for alcohol beverage retail licensees are unconstitutional under the “dormant” Commerce Clause.
Tennessee law requires an applicant for a retail license to have been a resident of Tennessee for at least the two-year period immediately preceding the submission of the license application. For corporate license applicants, the two-year requirement applies to any officer, director or stockholder of the corporation. Moreover, to renew such a license the law requires Tennessee residency for at least ten consecutive years.
Two prospective retail applicants that did not meet the two-year residency requirement, notably including the Tennessee affiliate of Total Wine Spirits & Beer, sought licenses. Expecting litigation, the Tennessee Attorney General filed a declaratory judgement action in state court seeking to have the residency requirements declared constitutional. The action was removed to federal court, and the Middle District of Tennessee found the requirements unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court of the United States’ 2005 decision in Granholm v. Heald, which required states allowing their own wineries to direct-ship to consumers to also grant such privileges to out-of-state wineries, marked the beginning of a new era of wine direct-shipping. With the relaxation of wine shipping laws around the country following Granholm—nearly every state now allows wineries to ship wine directly to in-state consumers—the wine direct-shipping landscape has changed greatly over the past decade. Indeed, wine shipments in 2016 saw double-digit growth in both volume and sales.
At the same time, growth in recent years in the online shopping industry has led to new innovations in the wine retail space: the existence of a multitude of internet wine retailers, wine-of-the-month clubs and mobile wine delivery apps offers consumers greater access to wine. Many states—and courts—though, are now grappling with the legalities surrounding direct shipping of wine by retailers, as well as the role of unlicensed third parties in such transactions. Some states prohibit retailers from directly shipping wine to consumers altogether, while many others give in-state retailers the right to ship wine directly to consumers while withholding the privilege from out-of-state retailers.
Most recently, in January 2017 Michigan enacted legislation allowing in-state retailers to ship wine to in-state consumers, but prohibiting out-of-state retailers from making such shipments. The new legislation, which amends Michigan’s existing statute addressing wine shipments, authorizes a retailer located in Michigan to obtain a “specially designated merchant license” in order to ship wine to in-state consumers. The specially designated merchant license is only available to in-state retailers, so retailers located outside Michigan remain prohibited from directly shipping wine to consumers in the state.
Unsurprisingly, given the requirements of Granholm (which, incidentally, concerned in part a Michigan law), the new legislation retains the right of both in-state and out-of-state wineries to ship wine directly to Michigan consumers upon obtaining a direct shipper license. In fact, the new statute even reduces the burden on wineries shipping to consumers; under the new law wineries will no longer be required to include their direct shipper license number and the order number on each shipping container, or the brand registration approval number for each shipped wine on the accompanying invoice (although label registration requirements will still apply).
The legislation does not go into effect until March 29, 2017, but already litigation involving the new law has commenced. In late January 2017, an Indiana retailer and several Michigan consumers sued Michigan’s governor and attorney general and the head of the Michigan Liquor Control Commission in federal court, alleging the statute violates the US Constitution’s Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause. Similar lawsuits are pending in Illinois and Missouri.
Some courts have already interpreted the constitutionality of similar laws that treat in-state and out-of-state wine retailers differently. While the US Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits have interpreted Granholm to apply only to differential treatment of producers and products (and not to wholesalers and retailers), the Fifth Circuit [...]
On April 21, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down its opinion in Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, No. 14-51343. It provides further guidance, at least within the Fifth Circuit, on the interplay of the “dormant” Commerce Clause and the 21st Amendment following the Supreme Court of the United States’ oft-cited decision in Granholm v. Heald, 544 US 460 (2005).
The case arose when the Texas Package Store Association attempted to revisit the Fifth Circuit’s two-decade old decision in Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 1994). Cooper v. McBeath permanently enjoined the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) from enforcing certain residency requirements imposed on wholesalers and retailers by the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code. In that decision, the Fifth Circuit decided that the residency requirement was a protectionist measure and therefore unconstitutional under the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause of the US Constitution.
In 2014, the Texas Package Store Association (TPSA) moved for relief from the Cooper v. McBeath injunction, arguing that Granholm and its progeny undermined the earlier decision’s reasoning. The district court ruled that the TPSA lacked standing to seek relief, although it also suggested that TPSA’s motion for relief should be denied on the merits.
In last month’s Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission decision, the Fifth Circuit concluded that TPSA had standing to seek relief from the Cooper v. McBeath injunction, but then held that TPSA’s motion should be denied on the merits. Laying out the standard for relief as whether Granholm and its progeny represent a “significant change in decisional law,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that no significant change had occurred.
The Fifth Circuit begins its analysis by noting that Granholm expressly refused to overrule prior cases holding that the Commerce Clause qualified states’ rights under the 21st Amendment. TPSA argued that the statement in Granholm labeling the three-tier system “unquestionably legitimate” essentially removed Commerce Clause protections from state laws dealing with the wholesale and retail tiers of the industry. Characterizing that language in Granholm as “dictum,” the Fifth Circuit rejected TPSA’s argument as “unconvincing.” Refusing to follow an Eighth Circuit decision that embraced logic similar to the argument advanced by TPSA, the Fifth Circuit instead relied on its own decision in Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2010). Thus “state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state liquor.” Instead, although the 21st Amendment permits a state to impose a physical-residency requirement that may favor in-state businesses, it may not impose “a durational-residency requirement on the owners of alcoholic beverage retailers and wholesalers.” (Quoting Cooper v. McBeath, emphasis in original).
The Fifth Circuit accordingly reasoned that nothing in Granholm and its subsequent application represent a significant change in the law. It therefore reversed the decision of the district court and directed it to enter an order denying on the merits TPSA’s motion for relief.
Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission [...]