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The Expanding Landscape of Alcohol Delivery Services

Following consumer trends and fueled by the pandemic and related loosening of restrictions on in-state retailer alcohol delivery regulations, the marketplace for alcohol delivery services has expanded exponentially over the last several years and shows no signs of slowing down. Industry forecasts predict double-digit growth year-over-year until at least 2025 for alcohol-focused e-commerce platforms. However, like anything in the alcohol beverage space, various avenues of penetration for new or existing companies come with certain restrictions that need to be balanced against opportunities for delivering customer convenience through alcohol delivery services.

Available Models

As alcohol delivery has grown and expanded in nearly every US state, numerous delivery models have developed to bring alcohol to a consumer’s doorstep. Of the various models, three have emerged as the most dominant go-to-market approaches to service this new industry sector.

The first are purely e-commerce platforms that connect consumers directly with a wide variety of licensed alcohol retailers but are themselves unlicensed (such as Drizly). The second are unlicensed white-labeled alcohol delivery services which appear as a branded website but integrate with a network of licensed retailers (like Thirstie). And the third are delivery platforms that themselves hold alcohol licenses (such as Gopuff).

Regulatory Opportunities and Impediments

While each of these models presents growth opportunities to service consumers’ desires to receive alcohol at their doorsteps, they also come with a host of restrictions that entities—and any investors in these companies—need to understand. Chief among these considerations are:

  • “Sale of Alcohol”: If the alcohol delivery service is itself unlicensed, the “sale” of alcohol must be between the consumer and the ultimate retail license holder. This means that the service cannot itself first receive the funds for the sale, take its fee and then pass the monies forward to the license holder. In some states, the provider may, however, be able to direct funds in the first instance to an escrow account or other independent account if the licensee retains a degree of control over the account. The licensed retailer should also always maintain control over the “sale” of alcohol, including setting pricing and accepting or rejecting orders.
  • Fee Structure: While state regulators allow for platforms to charge for their delivery and hard costs related to their services, how that fee is derived can be of particular significance if it is or can be correlated with alcohol sales. This restriction is premised on the fact that only a licensed entity should receive the benefit or privilege of the sale of alcohol. Accordingly, certain states like New York have suggested that if the fee structure is not a “flat fee” for services, receiving more than 10% of the revenue from a retailer as part of the sale of alcohol renders the platform a “Co-Licensee” and subject to the state’s authority and licensee vetting process.
  • Supplier Advertising: The ability of alcohol suppliers to pay to advertise on alcohol delivery platforms is of particular focus to alcohol state regulators. First, if the platform is itself unlicensed, the [...]

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ABI/SAB Miller Deal: DOJ Clarifies Best Efforts Clause in Proposed Final Judgment

As most members of the alcohol and beverage industry are aware, Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI) acquired the global holdings of SABMiller in a more than $100 billion merger in October 2016. The Department of Justice (DOJ) required ABI to divest SABMiller’s United States business, including its ownership interest in MillerCoors. Since November 2016, the parties have engaged in ongoing briefing seeking approval of a Proposed Final Judgment (PFJ) in the US District Court for the District of Columbia.

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Supreme Court’s 2014-15 Term: Antitrust Case May Impact the Activities of Alcohol Industry Public/Private Organizations

On October 14, 2014, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in a case that could have significant implications for hybrid public/private “regulatory” bodies.  Many such bodies, like state and local wine commissions, operate in the alcohol beverage space.

In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the actions of a state’s Board of Dental Examiners (Board) were subject to antitrust scrutiny by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  North Carolina clothes the Board with considerable authority to enforce the state’s laws concerning the unauthorized practice of dentistry by non-licensed persons.  The majority of the Board, however, consists of practicing dentists and dental hygienists.

The case arose from the Board’s actions to stop non-licensed persons from offering “teeth whitening” services within the state.  Seemingly responding to complaints from established dental practices, the Board issued cease-and-desist letters to numerous non-dentists offering teeth whitening services, effectively driving such over-the-counter services from the state.  The FTC subsequently investigated the Board’s actions, ultimately issuing an order prohibiting the Board from taking further action to restrict competition in teeth whitening services to persons licensed by the Board.

The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the Board’s actions are immune from antitrust scrutiny under the State Action Doctrine.  That doctrine shields from antitrust scrutiny the actions of a state when functioning in its capacity as a sovereign government.  For example, while private parties cannot set or fix prices, the legislature of a state may fix prices free from the restrictions of antitrust law.

The Fourth Circuit, agreeing with the FTC, held that the state action doctrine did not apply.  The Court of Appeals explained that public/private hybrid entities (such as bar associations) remain subject to the antitrust laws to ensure that their private members do not act in their own commercial self-interest.  Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s 1980 Midcal Aluminum decision that struck down a post-and-hold price posting law in California, the Fourth Circuit required the Board to show “active supervision” by the state government before it would permit the Board’s actions to receive the benefit of state action immunity.  The court then agreed with the FTC that the Board had failed to make that showing.

How the Supreme Court rules in the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners case will impact how public/private hybrid entities must operate within the alcohol beverage industry.  A number of states, for example, have established wine boards and commissions consisting primarily or wholly of private participants in the state’s wine industry.  These boards, however, may have the power to shape and implement state policies, such as establishing marketing orders, state wine trails and the like.  Clear national application of the antitrust laws to such bodies’ conduct could restrict current activities or at least require more careful internal policing to avoid potential exposure under the antitrust laws.




Local Wholesaler-Retailer Dispute Has Federal Implications

On August 14, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued an opinion finding that state regulations bolstered one antitrust claim and hindered another in an ongoing dispute between a northern Mississippi convenience store chain, Major Mart, and an Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI, a/k/a “Red Network”) distributor, Mitchell Distributing Company.

In Mississippi, by statute, like those of many other states, beer manufacturers must designate exclusive sales territories for each brand.  Mitchell holds the exclusive right to sell ABI brands to retailers in the counties in which Major Mart operates its 11 convenience stores.

The relationship between Mitchell and Major Mart started to break down in 2010, when Major Mart claimed that it was receiving inaccurate and confusing price information from Mitchell.  Major Mart asked Mitchell for compensation of lost profits due to the incorrect pricing information.  Mitchell denied the request, and Major Mart decided later to remove ABI displays and signs, lower the prices of competitors’ products, and reduce the cooler space allocated to ABI in some of its stores.  According to Major Mart’s complaint, Mitchell retaliated by (1) demanding shelving allocation that represented ABI’s market share of approximately 70 percent, (2) demanding price parity with competing products of ABI, (3) changing its deliveries to Major Mart stores to once a week so as to fill up Major Mart’s coolers and storerooms, leaving no room for competitor products and (4) delivering on Fridays so that Major Mart stores would not have cold beer on the “best selling day of the week.”

After litigation was first initiated, the parties reached a settlement in 2011, agreeing that Mitchell would increase its deliveries to at least twice per week and Major Mart would reconsider shelf space allocation and increase prices on competing brands of beers to the same price as ABI products.  This temporary resolution, however, failed when Major Mart did not reallocate its shelf space.  In response, Mitchell once again cut deliveries to one day per week and thereafter began to provide sales coupons and promotional giveaways exclusively to Major Mart’s competitors.  Major Mart also claimed that Mitchell delivered beer that was close to the end of its shelf-life, replaced fresher beer Major Mart had with older beer and missed deliveries during key dates, including July 4 and just as students were returning to college.  Eventually, Major Mart sued.

Major Mart alleged that Mitchell engaged in monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act and price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.  In response, Mitchell filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the Sherman Act did not apply, as (1) Mitchell’s actions were immunized by the State Action Doctrine—the principle that the Sherman Act does not apply to states acting in their capacities as sovereigns—and (2) Mitchell’s actions, which occurred solely in Mississippi, did not affect interstate commerce—as required for Sherman Act jurisdiction.

Quickly discarding the State Action Doctrine assertion, the court noted that to qualify as a state’s action, conduct must be “undertaken pursuant to [...]

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